

A

REVIEW

OF THE

STATE

OF THE

BRITISH NATION.

Tuesday, May 3. 1709.

IN order to convince the Men of Reason among our *Jacobites*, that their Cause is near its End, and that it is Time for them to lay it down, I attempted in my last to give them a Scheme of the Posture of the *French* Affairs, on which they have hitherto depended — And I brought it down to the last Campaign — In pursuing this Description, I persuade my self, I shall do two Things together.

1. Show the *Jacobites*, if they have any Eyes to their own Interest, that there is no more Room to hope, as to the retrieving their Party or their Cause, and so argue the Reasonableness, in Respect to their own Interest, of re-

conciling themselves to the Government, before it be too late, and before the Government is provok'd to take new Measures with them.

2. Shew the Necessity of the Allies making the utmost Advantage of the present low Circumstances of *France*, and not, by too precipitate a Compliance, close with Offers, tho' good in themselves, any thing short of an effectual Security against the Possibility of reviving the Hopes of this Party in *Britain*.

If there be the least View, however remote, that *French* Power may ever revive, *Jacobitism* will never die; and if this
Canaanite

Canaanite be not rooted out of the Land, it is in vain to talk of Peace abroad, we shall never have any Peace at home—— When therefore we are talking to our Allies of Terms and Conditions, we argue the Necessity of their Security against the future Invasions of the Exorbitant Power of *France*, and we have Reason there too——

But when we are talking to our own People, the Argument turns upon another Hinge; we must never end this War, till *France* is effectually reduc'd to such a Condition, as from which *Jacobitism* in *Britain* can receive no more Encouragement; if there are any other Necessities, *this is double*——

If any of our Neighbours think we insist upon too large Terms, and that they ought not to be oblig'd to carry on the War for Things, which, in Comparison of the main Article of Europe's Peace, are not considerable: I say, this is a full Answer, We have a War to carry on against *Jacobitism*——And it must be reduc'd entirely, before the War with *France* can end—— It is this for which we make War with *France*——

As long as *France* is in the least Capacity to revive *Jacobitism* in *Britain*, she is not effectually reduc'd; and if we yield to any Peace till this is secur'd, it will be no Peace at all to us—— I sometimes wonder, that of all the Gentlemen who have wrote, and some of them very well upon that Subject, none of them has thought fit to carry it to this Height; our whole Concern in the War lies here——What signifies Trade secur'd, Spain restor'd, the Dutch Barrier strengthened, strong Fortifications demolish'd, and *France* humbled——These are indeed mighty Things in themselves; but what are they all to us, if our grand Enemy at home, that eats out all our National Peace, is not destroy'd? If Faction and Party-Strife be not crush'd, if all Foreign Prospects are not taken from them, if their Dependence is not taken entirely away, *French* Power is the grand Basis, on which the *Jacobites* expect to build *British* Tyranny as a Column, and *James III.* as the Capital—— If this Basis is not pull'd down, or rather dug up to the very Foundation, the Pillar stands still, and we have fought, and bled, and wasted for nothing; the Work will be all to do over again,

Let no Man say then, that we are too backward to make a Peace—— What if *France* yields to the Confederacy all the *Spanish* Monarchy? What if he should strip himself to the *Pyrenean* Treaty? What if every Ally has fully conceded their utmost Demand? If this Point be not gain'd for us, how easie will it be for *France* to unravel the whole Work, and fight all these Victories over again?

Suppose now a Peace made with the utmost Caution that the Allies can use—— This Article excepted—— Let us enquire a little into the Consequence—— After the Peace, the Arms of Europe being laid down, all our Troops disbanded, and the Nations resting on the Faith of general Peace, in the midst of a profound Calm, and under a most perfect Tranquillity, comes the Pretender, and upon his own Strength, in his own Name, and without any Breach between us and *France*, he invades *Britain*, lands 8 or 10000 Men in *Scotland* or in *Ireland*. The Pope, or any remote Prince shall hire him Ships, and hire him Troops, and lend him Arms. The King of *France*, good Man, is no way concern'd, he may let any of his Subjects serve him, any of his Generals take Pay under him, — &c. That he shall have 30000 *French* Troops, *French* Officers, *French* Stores, *French* Ships, and 20000000 of *French* Money, and yet the *French* King not concern'd—— Thus the King of *Denmark* lends us his Troops, yet the *French* and *Danes* are at Peace together—— Thus the very same *French* King artickled with the *Spaniards* not to assist the *Portuguese*, after the Revolt of *John of Braganza*.—— But *D. Schombergh* had Leave to go and serve the King of *Portugal* for Pay; and if any *French* Men would go Volunteers, the King of *France* could not hinder them; and thus 6000 *French* Troops serv'd in that War against *Spain*, and effectually broke the *Spanish* Forces.

I will not say, that *French* Power and *Jacobitism* together, when *Britain* shall be left alone in the War, shall not be too strong for us—— And we are none of us so ignorant as not to know, that by the Laws of War, if the Pretender can hire the whole Power of *France*, whether of Land Force

Force or Naval, or Auxiliaries or Mercenaries, it is no Breach of the Treaty—The Histories of the present and past Ages of the World for 200 Years are full of Instances of this, and I appeal to any indifferent Judge, whether it is not therefore absolutely necessary that this War be continued, till the King of *France* be oblig'd wholly to renounce the Interest of the Pretender, and that the whole Confederacy be made Guaranties of his punctual observing that Breach of it.

I cannot tell, whether I can resolve, what is an effectual Security—Nor how far the King of *France* must go, before the *Jacobites* in this Island will cease to hope in him—It is not my Business to prescribe—I must own, I think, a bare baptizing or expelling the Person of the Pretender out of his Dominions, is not sufficient—But if he oblige himself to enter into a League Offensive and Defensive with *Britain*, the States of *Holland*, and the Elector of *Hanover*, for the Preservation of the Act of Succession and the Union, it might go a great Way—Having first recogniz'd the Queen as Legal and Rightful Sovereign of *Britain*, and openly renounc'd the Title of the Pretender, and engag'd never directly or indirectly to aid or assist him, &c.

Now, if this be thought hard, pray, Gentlemen, will you tell me, any Body that can, without it, what is all your Peace good for, and how long will you maintain it?—And all we are struggling for is to have the Peace secure—If you venture to make a Peace that is not to be depended upon—Pray tell me, when these Nations will be in a Condition to carry on another War? And if you have *France* now at your Discretion, and do not make your Peace as secure as you have made your War, when you come to groan under a new Eruption, who will pity you?

But say some, how can you expect the Confederates, if all they fight for is obtain'd, and all they think of Moment for you to ask is granted, should carry on the War purely to gratifie *England*—When perhaps they have as much Need of Peace almost as *France* it self—And, secondly, will not this make *France* despe-

rate? And you may miss the End, and so lose the Advantage of an Honourable Peace, while you may have it; Like the Dog in the Fable, grasping at the Shadow, and lose the Substance?

These Things will lead me to examine several Heads, which I shall speak to in their Order.

1. Of what Concern securing the Peace of *Britain*, is to the rest of the Confederacy?
2. Of what Concern crushing *Jacobitism* is to the securing the Peace of *Britain*?
3. What Certainty there is of your being able to bring *France* to comply?
4. The Necessity of carrying on the War till we do.

Tho' it might be really thought needless to offer any Arguments to the Gentlemen of the *Jacobite* Party, to persuade them to think of giving over their Pursuit after their Cause, since the Reduction of *French* Power by the Victories of the Allies—Yet I cannot but speak to one, which they seem to lay some Stress upon, viz. That the *French* will have another Push for it, and we are not so sure of reducing them—And if we make Peace otherwise, it must be by stooping to such Conditions, as that the *French* may still be in Condition to give their Cause some future Relief, when he has taken Breath a little.

I might indeed go thro' the Circumstances of *Europe*, and prove the Improbability of this; but I shall leave that Road, in which much has been said already, and only enter upon Matter of Demonstration—We have now an Account, the K. of *France* has sent his Secretary Monsieur *Torcy* to the *Hague*—And without entring upon Particulars, I refer only to the Face of Things, and let any Body observe, the nearer the Time of Action comes on, the larger Concessions the King of *France* will make—And there is no doubt, but if WE INSIST, we may have all that is fit for us to ask, or in his Power to grant, even to the Half of his Kingdom.